Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2000

Golden Eagle Oil Refinery, Inc. v. Woods Cross
City : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael Z. Hayes; Mazuran and Hayes; Attorney for Defendant/Appellee.
Gregory M. Simonsen; Alexander Dushku; Bryan H. Booth; Kirton and McConkie; Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Golden Eagle Oil Refinery v. Woods Cross City, No. 20001010 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3007

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

MLtU
Utah Court of Appeals

JUN 0 6 2001
-BauiefiaStaggClerk of the Court

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GOLDEN EAGLE OIL REFINERY,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellant
REPLY BRIEF
vs.

Case No. 20001010-CA
WOODS CROSS CITY, a municipal
corporation and political subdivision of
the State of Utah,

Civil No. 990700470
Second District Court, Davis County
Priority No. 15

Defendant/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from a Final Order of the Second Judicial District Court,
in and for Davis County, Judge Jon M. Memmott

Michael Z. Hayes
Mazuran & Hayes
2118 East 3900 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee

Gregory M. Simonsen (#4669)
Alexander Dushku (#7712)
Bryan H. Booth (#7471)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
Oral Argument and Published Decision
Requested

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GOLDEN EAGLE OIL REFINERY,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellant
REPLY BRIEF
vs.

Case No. 20001010 - CA

WOODS CROSS CITY, a municipal
corporation and political subdivision of
the State of Utah,

Civil No. 990700470
Second District Court, Davis County
Priority No. 15

Defendant/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from a Final Order of the Second Judicial District Court,
in and for Davis County, Judge Jon M. Memmott

Michael Z. Hayes
Mazuran & Hayes
2118 East 3900 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee

Gregory M. Simonsen (#4669)
Alexander Dushku (#7712)
Bryan H. Booth (#7471)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
Oral Argument and Published Decision
Requested

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

INTRODUCTION

1

REPLY TO FACTUAL MISSTATEMENTS

2

ARGUMENT

5

I.

II.

III.

On Appeal this Court Accords No Deference To The Trial Court;
The City Has The Burden of Proving Termination Of A
Nonconforming Use

5

Utah Law Construes Zoning Ordinances Narrowly; Broad Statements
of Intent Cannot Substitute For The Substantive Provisions Of
The Ordinance

6

The City Fails To Address The Fact That Golden Eagle's Operations Including Its Storage Tanks - Are A Single Nonconforming Use

9

IV.

The Storage Tanks Were Continuously In Use

10

V.

The Removal Of The Old Storage Tanks To Comply With State
Environmental Regulations Did Not Constitute A "Cessation of
Use" Under The Woods Cross City Ordinance

13

The Certified Tanks Did Not Enlarge, Extend, or Change Golden
Eagle's Nonconforming Use And Therefore Must Be Permitted
Under the Ordinance

16

In The Alternative, The Certified Tanks Must Be Allow As An
Accessory Use

19

VIII. The Rule Golden Eagle Proposes Is Narrow And Will Not Materially
Disrupt The City's Land Use Goals

21

VI.

VII.

CONCLUSION

22

-lDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
A. L. Carrithers & Son v. City of Louisville, 63 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1933)
Application and Appeal of O'Neal, 92 S.E.2d 189 (N.C. 1956)

15
14, 15 16, 22

Bellemeade Co. v. Priddle, 503 S.W.2d 734 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973)

8

Brown v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1998)

6, 7

Cardillo v. South Bethany, No. 86A-N02, 86C-OC23, 86M-OC8,
1991 De. Super. LEXIS 222, (Del. Super. 1991)

8

Chanhassen Estates Residents Assoc, v. City ofChanhassen, 342 N.W.2d
335 (Minn. 1984)

8

Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Village of Inverness, 735 N.E.2d 686
(111. App. Ct. 2000)

8

City of Tulsa v. Mizel, 265 P.2d 496 (Okla. 1953)

8

Derby Refining Company v. City of Chelsea, 555 N.E.2d 534 (Mass. 1990) . . . 17, 18, 22
DeKalb Co. v. Post Apartment Homes, L.P., 506 S.E.2d 899 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)

8

Denomme v. Mowry, 557 A.2d 1229 (R.I. 1989)

9

Forest City v. Payson, 239 A.2d 167 (Me. 1968)

8

Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake City, 431 P.2d 559 (Utah 1967)
Gilchrist v. Town of Lake George Planning Board, 680 N.Y.S.2d 320
.(N.Y. App. Div. 1998)

10

18, 20, 21

Hugoe v. Woods Cross City, 1999 UT App 281, 988 P.2d 456

7

In re: Fairhope Bd. of Adj. and Appeals, 567 So. 2d 1353 (Ala. 1990)

8

Keller v. City ofBellingham, 600 P.2d 1276 (Wash. 1979)
-iiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18

Mossman v. City ofColombus, 449 N.W.2d 214 (Ne. 1989)

16

Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996)

5

New Orleans v. Benchabbat, 566 So. 626 (La. 1990)

8

New Orleans v. Elms, 566 So. 2d 626 (La. 1990)

5

Patterson v. Utah County Bel. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602
(Utah App. 1995)

6, 7

Selligman v. Von Allmen Bros., Inc., 179 S.W.2d 207 (Ky. App. 1944)

16

State v. City of Nashville, 343 S.W.2d 847 (Term. 1961)

.9

State v. Lum, 807 P.2d 40 (Haw. Ct. App. 1991)

8

Sunnyside Up Corp. v. City of Lancaster Zoning Hearing Bd., 739 A.2d
644 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999)

8

Thomas v. Crescent City, 503 So.2d 1299 (Fla. Ct. App. 1987)

8

Tillery v. Meadows Construction Co., 681 S.W.2d 330 (Ark. 1984)

8

Township of Fremont v. McGarvie, 417 N.W.2d 560 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)

8

V-l Oil v. Dept. of Environ. Quality, 904 P.2d 214 (Utah App. 1995)

11

Whistler v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 741 P.2d 422 (Mont. 1987)

8

Zickefoose v. Bd. of Zoning App. Green Township, No. 99-COA-01307,
2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4122, (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2000)

8

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 15-7-3

6

Utah Code Ann. § 15-7-5

6

Woods Cross City Ordinances § 12-2-103

19

-iiiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INTRODUCTION
In the Brief of Appellee, the City fails to engage the central issues of this case and the
powerful precedent Golden Eagle has adduced to support its position. Boiled down, the
City's argument is basically that the District Court must have been correct because any other
outcome would conflict with the broad intent language in the City's Ordinance. As did the
District Court in its decision, the City on appeal employs such language as a solvent to
dissolve any doctrinal, factual, or equitable difficulties posed by its unreasonably harsh
interpretation of the Ordinance - an interpretation which the City's own planning
commission unanimously declined to adopt.
The City's approach is untenable. Utah law is clear that broad statements of intent do
not vest city councils and reviewing courts with the discretion to disregard the plain meaning
of specific provisions in city ordinances. Indeed, it is well established that zoning
ordinances, including those concerning nonconforming uses, are strictly construed in favor
of the property owner. Any ambiguity or uncertainty in the Ordinance must be interpreted
in favor of Golden Eagle.
The core issues in this case center on the meaning of specific provisions in the
Ordinance in light of State law and the demands of basic due process. The City essentially
ignores the large body of compelling precedent, some from this Court, interpreting such
provisions or analogous language. This Court should not follow suit. Application of this
Court's own precedent and respect for the well reasoned decisions from other jurisdictions
under closely analogous facts, as well as a commonsense approach to the facts and the text
of the Ordinance at issue in this case, can only lead to the conclusion that the District Court
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-1.

erred in its decision.
REPLY TO FACTUAL MISSTATEMENTS
The City's Statement of Facts accurately sets forth many (though not all) of the key
facts in this case, providing appropriate citations to the record. The only clarification
necessary relates to paragraph 5, where the City states that "none of the diesel sludge and/or
water in the Old Tanks was used by Golden Eagle in its operations." Brief of Appellee
("City Brf"), p. 3, Tf 5. It is true that Golden Eagle did not reprocess the used petroleum
product in the Old Tanks. But, as Golden Eagle set forth in its opening brief without any
challenge from the City, the storage of used petroleum product is not a separate operation or
separate nonconforming use but an integral part of Golden Eagle's overall operations which
exist as a legal nonconforming use. Brief of Appellant ("Brf. App."), pp. 6-7.
In the argument section of its brief, however, the City makes a number of bald factual
assertions which are either misleading or have no support whatsoever in the record:
1.

Statement: "Significantly, during all this time, Golden Eagle continuously used

other storage tanks on the Property for storage of used oil products that were to be recycled
by Golden Eagle." City Brf, p. 11.
Response: The City provides no citation to the record to support this statement.
The intended implication appears to be that, in contrast to the Old Tanks, all "other storage
tanks on the Property" were used in the recycling operations, as opposed to just for storage
of use petroleum products. There is no record support for any such implication.
2.

Statement: "[T]he Old Tanks which were replaced by Golden Eagle played no

part in their operations from at least 1993 to the present date . . . ." City Brf, p. 13.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Response: This statement gives a false impression. While it is true that the
used petroleum product in the Old Tanks was not rotated out for over a year, Golden Eagle's
"operations" include the storage of used petroleum product not only for recycling but also
for ultimate disposal when recycling is not possible. See Brf. App., pp. 6-7.
3.

Statement: "In truth, the installation of the Certified Tanks has nothing to do

with regulations of the State Department of Environmental Quality and everything to do with
current market conditions. Because of increased demand for re-recyled [sic] oil products,
Golden Eagle wanted to increase its used oil storage capacity." City Brf., p. 16.
Response: These statements find absolutely no support in the record. As set
forth in Golden Eagle's opening brief, Golden Eagle was directly supervised by the
Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ") in its endeavors to clean up the Property.
Brf. App., pp. 9-10. An important element of the approved clean-up "plan [was] to replace
these older storage tanks with new tanks." R. App. at 82. David Wheeler, a DEQ official
overseeing Golden Eagle's efforts, stated in his March 9, 1999 Used Oil Inspection Report
that "[fjuture improvements include . . . getting new tanks . . . . " Id. (emphasis added). The
City's assertion that "installation of the Certified Tanks has nothing to do with regulations
of the State Department of Environmental Quality" is absurd. According to the undisputed
evidence in the record, the only reason Golden Eagle went to the huge expense and trouble
of installing the Certified Tanks was to comply with State regulations. See Brf. App., pp.
7-12. It is pure speculation for the City to assert that the actual motive behind the installation
of the new tanks was Golden Eagle's desire to "increase its used oil storage capacity" due
to "current market conditions;" the record says no such thing. To the contrary, as the City
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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itself concedes in its Statement of Facts, replacing the Old Storage Tanks with the Certified
Tanks did not "increase" Golden Eagle's storage capacity but rather reduced it by 86,000
gallons. See City Brf, p. 3, f 6.
4.

Statement: "If allowed to use [the Certified Tanks], Golden Eagle's operations

on the site will, in fact, expand. More importantly, the life of Golden Eagle's nonconforming
use will be significantly extended . . . ." City Brf., p. 17.
Response: The record provides no support for such assertions. The City
adduced no evidence whatsoever that there would be any expansion of Golden Eagle's
operations due to the Certified Tanks. There is no evidence in the record of any additional
impact of any sort on neighboring properties due to the Certified Tanks; indeed, the evidence
indicates that negative impacts will be reduced since an environmental hazard would be
eliminated and the tanks placed further away from the adjacent properties. See Brf. App.,
pp. 11-12; R. App. at 85-86. And there is no evidence in the record that Golden Eagle's
overall nonconforming use will be "significantly extended" due to the Certified Tanks. The
City's assertion to the contrary is merely speculation. The only relevant evidence in the
record is that Golden Eagle's storage capacity has been reduced by the installation of the
Certified Tanks. See City Brf, p. 3, \ 6.
5.

Statement: "Similarly, in this case, Golden Eagle's installation of the Certified

Tanks will increase the storage capacity of the plant from its previous capacity." City Brf,
p. 20.
Response: This statement is false. As the undisputed evidence establishedand as the City's own Statement of Facts confirms - replacement of the Old Tanks with the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Certified Tanks reduced Golden Eagle's physical storage capacity by 86,000 gallons. See
City Br f , p 3, f 6; see also Br i: / Vpp , pj: , 11 12; R \pp •. at 85-36 i Vs dei t: icn isti atedt c lo\ v,
' \\;y V. : :• \ • an iilake such an argument is through verbal gymnastics and circular
reasoning.
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portion of Golden Eagle's nonconforming use.
I
II.

Utah Law Construes Zoning Ordinances Narrowly; Broad Statements of Intent
Cannot Substitute For The Substantive Provisions Of The Ordinance.
The District Court repeatedly invoked the City Ordinance's general statement that its
<

purpose was to "eliminate" nonconforming uses, and then rejected any reading of the
Ordinance that might allow a nonconforming use to continue. See Brf. App., pp. 47-49; Add.
atlO, 13-14. In its opening brief, Golden Eagle argued that the District Court's interpretation

*

of the Ordinance was erroneous: despite the broad statement of intent, the actual provisions
of the Ordinance indicate that the City has chosen not to eliminate nonconfomiing uses but

.

rather to allow them to continue, even perpetually, under certain restrictions.1 Brf. App., pp.
18-19, 48-49. Golden Eagle then demonstrated that under a reasonable and fair reading of
i
the various provisions of the Ordinance, installation of the Certified Tanks was permitted.
Id. at 20-47.
On appeal, the City predictably commences its argument with a plea for the broadest

'It is well established that inconsistency with a general statement of intent does not
constitute violation of an ordinance. Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893
P.2d 602, 610 (Utah App. 1995) ("By satisfying the actual regulations enumerated in [the
ordinance], the proposed [land use] has met the legal requirements of that section. We
will not find a violation of law simply because the Board's decision may seem
inconsistent with the general intent statement found in [the ordinance] when it is in
compliance with the substantive provisions of that ordinance.") (emphasis added); Brown
v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1998) ("Sections 15-7-3(a) and
15- 7-5(a) of the Code crepresent[] [only] the broad goal sought to be achieved by the
[city] in enacting regulations governing' uses of properties in these zones. Through the
purpose declaration, Sandy explained what its goal was in establishing the residential
zones. It then enumerated specific regulations to meet that goal. 'By satisfying the actual
regulations enumerated in [ §§ 15-7-3 (b)(2) and 15-7- 5 (b)(2)J the [use of the properties]
has met the legal requirements of those sections,' and, thus, met the general purpose of
the statute") (bracketed
language
inW.original;
omitted;
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the City itself (nlcluding its present counsel) and a nonconforming

use issue, this Court

reiterated the established standard ii; \ Mali for interpreting all zoning ordinances:
Moreover, "because zoning ordinances are in derogation of a property owner!s
common-law right to unrestricted use of his or her property, provisions therein
restricting property uses should be strictly construed . . . in favor of the
property owner." Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602,
606 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Hugoe v. Woods Cross City, 1999 UT App 281. at €| 8, 988 P.2d 456 (emphasis addedV see
ciLst : • Bt < iwn v. Sandy City Boa) < ioj \ it ijustnu mt, >
same language from Patterson).

.

w g

Using this established rule of construction, tllis Court in

Hugoe read the City's nonconforming use Ordinance permissively so as to allow the property
owner to conti:ui< its noncoi..<.-;..ringuse, rejecting the < ..{\ •» hyper-teciinica! arguments to
tl le :ontrai ;; - 1/999 1 1" I N px

'
MM
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and instead directs the Court to numerous decisions from other jurisdictions. See City Brf.,
pp. 6-7. Given I Jtah's established rule of interpretation, such cases are wholly inapposite.
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favor of the property owner.
i
2

In re: Fairhope Bd. of Adj. and Appeals, 567 So. 2d 1353, 1355 (Ala. 1990)
("land use restrictions are to be strictly construed in favor of the landowner"); Tillery v.
Meadows Construction Co., 681 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Ark. 1984) ("zoning laws must be
strictly construed in favor of the property owner"); Cardillo v. South Bethany, No. 86AN02, 86C-OC23, 86M-OC8, 1991 De. Super. LEXIS 222, at *8 (Del. Super. 1991)
("zoning ordinances . . . must be construed in case of doubt in favor of the unrestricted
use of the land"); Thomas v. Crescent City, 503 So.2d 1299, 1301 (Fla. Ct. App. 1987)
("zoning ordinances should be given their broadest meaning when there is no definition
or clear intent to the contrary and the ordinance should be interpreted in favor of the
property owner"); DeKalb Co. v. Post Apartment Homes, L.P., 506 S.E.2d 899, 901 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1998) ("Georgia follows a majority of states in holding that zoning ordinances
should be strictly construed in favor of the property owner, and ambiguities in the
language of zoning ordinances should be resolved in favor of the free use of property.");
State v. hum, 807 P.2d 40, 43 (Haw. Ct. App. 1991) ("Zoning ordinances are in
derogation of the common law, and their provisions must be strictly construed.");
Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Village of Inverness, 735 N.E.2d 686, 691 (111. App. Ct.
2000) ("The language in zoning ordinances should be interpreted in favor of the free use
of property."); Bellemeade Co. v. Priddle, 503 S.W.2d 734, 742 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973)
("Zoning ordinances care in derogation of the common law' . . . and should be strictly
construed in favor of the property owner."); New Orleans v. Benchabbat, 566 So. 626,
633 (La. 1990) ("A zoning ordinance . . . must be construed, when subject to more than
one reasonable interpretation, according to the interpretation which allows the least
restricted use of the property."); Forest City v. Payson, 239 A.2d 167, 169 (Me. 1968)
("A zoning ordinance, like any other statute which is in derogation of the common law,
must be strictly construed."); Township of Fremont v. McGarvie, 417 N.W.2cl 560, 562
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987) ("the language [of a land use ordinance] must be interpreted,
where doubt exists, in favor of the property owner"); Chanhassen Estates Residents
Assoc, v. City of Chanhassen, 342 N.W.2d 335, 340 (Minn. 1984) ("a zoning ordinance is
in derogation of the common law and should be construed strictly against the city and in
favor of the property owner."); Whistler v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 741 P.2d 422, 425
(Mont. 1987) ("since zoning laws and ordinances are in derogation of the common law
right to free use of private property, such ordinances should be strictly construed.");
Zickefoose v. Bd. of Zoning App. Green Township, No. 99-COA-01307, 2000 Ohio App.
LEXIS 4122, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2000) (zoning ordinances "must be strictly
construed in favor of the property owner, and 'the scope of restrictions cannot be
extended to include limitations not clearly prescribed.'"); City of Tulsa v. Mizel, 265 P.2d
496, 498 (Okla. 1953) ("Zoning ordinances . . .will be strictly construed and any
ambiguity or uncertainty decided in favor of property owners."); Sunnyside Up Corp. v.
City of Lancaster Zoning Hearing Bd., 739 A.2d 644, 648 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999)
("where a term in a zoning
ordinance
undefined,
ambiguity
thatBYU.
term must be
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the Howard W.isHunter
Law Library,an
J. Reuben
Clark Law in
School,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<

i

{

^

(

i

In short, under Utah law, the Ordinance n rust be "strictly c<msirue<*" 'a fr

;

of

(iulden Eagle and against lit*. «' 'il); any ambiguits is therefore interpreted in ao ia oi i - lea
Eagle. The City cannot retreat to broad expire •.•:'

••

.* •-

- <,--;

provisions of the Ordinance do not contemplate.
TT r

i lie C,'it> 1 ails 1 o Address 1 he Fact That Golden Eagle's Operations-Including
Jls Stora<je Tanks - Are A Single Nonconforming Use.
1 he court below interpreted the ( )rdh iai ice so as t 3 i endei tl ic Old I ai iks a sepai ate

and distinct nonconforming use that could be eliminated after a year of alleged nonuse, rather
than as an integral par* of :^ ~ < ; ^ larger nonconforming use. Golden Eagle argued '• i;;
(i"' ' ' , , i '

K

o

{

- j •;

.a nanee\

which would essentially allow the City to dismantle Golden Eagle's noriconn ' a ig u.sc hoi!
by bolt. See Brf A pp. pp. 20-22.
On appeal, tl ic City essentially ignores this enl^.n p^nit iur ob\ ions reasons, This
(

'/,.

v:

-

*

'

•

,

'

lieu. In Ilugoc, the City argued "that since the subject y- -pe^v [\\:\s beina! Msedmerel> for
storage and parkin:?, it [\V;K"! »-.ot being used [for the h.yu' nonconforming use of] transfer
con lpai i) activ ities" ' ai id tl: n is : ais i lot a 1( 7a, 1.i..cl i IOI ic oi ifoi n i.ii ig i ise. 1999 t J I App. ]\ 9 ' 1 1 i.e
Com t "rejected] this argument," reasoning that u [:lhe use of the r--wr*. ; - •• <

construed in Euor o{ the use proposed b> the property lAMier""); Dcnoitunc \. Mown'., 557
A.2d 1229, 12 •* AA \ 9:^9 i i '\\c are rcuuircd to resoE i al'doubts and ambiguities in'he
zoning laws in favor oi the landowner^'). State v. City o1 \ashvilU\ 34? S.W 2d 847, S50
(Tenn. 1061 > ("because [zoning ordinances] deprive the owner of property use ofhis land
which would otherwise be lawful, are to be strictly construed in favor of the property
owner").
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

storage, and staging activities is an integral part in the operation of a transfer company" as
opposed to a separate nonconforming use. Id. (citing Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake
City, 431 P.2d 559, 564 (Utah 1967)) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court held that
the property owner "[was] entitled to continue such use under the new ordinance as a valid
nonconforming use." Id.
The same is plainly true here: use of storage tanks containing used petroleum product
"is an integral part" of the overall operation of Golden Eagle's unquestionably legal
nonconforming use - not a separate and distinct use. Factories and operations like Golden
Eagle's often consist of many interconnected component parts that form the single coherent
whole which constitutes the nonconforming use. The Court should not interpret the
Ordinance in a way that would allow for each piece of the integrated whole to be sliced off
because, for whatever reason, it has not been used for one year. Such a reading would
produce clearly arbitrary and absurd results. By that rationale, for instance, the portion of
a nonconforming factory containing equipment for fire-fighting activities would cease to be
part of the legal nonconforming use unless utilized once a year - even if there had been no
need.
Removing the Old Storage Tanks and replacing them with the Certified Tanks did not
constitute a cessation in any way of Golden Eagle's single nonconforming use. The District
Court's decision should be reversed on this ground alone.
IV.

The Storage Tanks Were Continuously In Use.
The City's principal argument is that because "Golden Eagle put no new material into

the storage tanks" and did not "remove any material from those tanks" for more than a year
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

it necessarily follows that the tanks ceased to be "in use" within the meaning of § 12-22-106
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as a "'ridiculous
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mischaracterization" any suggestion that its position would require a legal nonconforming
business to rotate its stored inventory or materials at least once a year. City Brf, p. 12.
"Nowhere," the City protests, "has [it] argued for the District Court or this Court to adopt a
rule which would require inventories to be rotated." Id. Nevertheless, that is precisely what
the City's extremely cramped reading of the term "in use" would require. How else under
the City's rigid interpretation could a nonconforming warehouse, for instance, maintain its
status as a nonconforming use? The owner would have no choice but to do exactly what the
City faults Golden Eagle for not doing: put "new material" into the warehouse and "remove
[some] material from" it at least once a year, i.e., rotate the inventory in the warehouse. Cf.
City Brf, p. 11. Such a position is indeed "ridiculous," but it necessarily follows from the
City's own argument.
Finally, as noted above, the City's assertion that the Old Tanks "played no part in
[Golden Eagle's] operations from at least 1993 to the present" and thus were not "in use" is
a distortion based on a play on words. Golden Eagle's "operations" include the storage of
unrecyclable petroleum products for ultimate disposal. See Brf. App, pp. 6-7. That was the
"part" which those tanks "played" in Golden Eagle's "operations;" that was the use to which
they were put. There is nothing in the Ordinance remotely suggesting that storage - to which
entire businesses are devoted - cannot be a valid use.
Thus, even assuming arguendo that the tanks can be considered a discrete
nonconforming use within Golden Eagle's overall legal nonconforming use, the City's
argument that the tanks were not "in use" for more than a year is without merit.
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V.

The Removal Of The Old Storage Tanks To Comply With State Environmental
Regulations Did Not Constitute A "Cessation of Use9' Under The Woods Cross
City Ordinance,
There is no dispute that the Old Storage Tanks did not comply with State

environmental regulations and that Golden Eagle was legally required to bring its operations
into compliance with State law. However, the City argues that because Golden Eagle could
have complied with State regulations by simply destroying its storage tanks, it was not really
"required" to replace them. City Brf, pp. 15-16. In fact, as set forth above in the Reply to
Factual Misstatements, supra, Golden Eagle's clean-up efforts were closely monitored and
regulated by the Department of Environmental Quality. The City's bald assertion that State
regulations had "nothing to do" with the installation of the Certified Tanks is manifestly
false. See City Brf., p. 16.
Admittedly, the City's draconian logic is true in a trivial sense. Golden Eagle could
indeed have complied with the State's dictates for cleaning up the Property by simply
shutting down its entire operations, or removing whatever portion of its operations was in
violation of State law. That is nearly always true of business, health, safety, and
environmental regulations. One can always ensure that a car does not violate State emissions
standards by junking it, as opposed to replacing a faulty exhaust system. A store owner can
always comply with regulations requiring businesses to install wheelchair ramps by simply
shutting down the business.
But such sophistry does not change the fact that when Golden Eagle fixed the problem
with the tanks in the manner approved by State regulators, it did so under compulsion of
State law and not voluntarily. As argued in the opening brief, the rule that has emerged from
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the cases is that as long as the replacement structure is on "substantially the same scale" as
the previous one, the owner has the right to replace a nonconforming structure to comply
with State regulations. See Brf. App., pp. 30-33. There is no evidence suggesting that
Golden Eagle's operations would not remain on substantially the same scale after installation
of the Certified Tanks. In fact, Golden Eagle's physical storage capacity would decrease (by
86,000 gallons) as would the total number of storage tanks (by eleven).
Needless to say, the City's harsh approach finds no support in the case law dealing
with analogous situations. As discussed in the opening brief, the court in Application and
Appeal of O'Neal, 92 S.E.2d 189 (N.C. 1956), addressed a situation where State regulators
informed the owners of a nursing home, a legal nonconforming use, that they would not be
allowed to continue operations unless they complied with the new State building code. Id.
at 191. Of course, one way for the owners to have complied would have been to cease to use
the building as a nursing home; in fact, instead of being torn down the building was
ultimately used for other related activities not barred by the building code, so that approach
was not out of the question. Nevertheless, the court reversed the city's denial of a permit to
replace the old nursing home with a new one because the necessity of constructing a new
building was "not by reason of their choice or voluntary act, but [was] necessary to meet the
requirements of [State law]." Id. at 195. The court allowed the owners "as a matter of right"
to construct a new structure that complied with State building standards provided it was "on
substantially the same scale as [the building] in operation when the [zoning] ordinance was
adopted." Id. at 195-96. This approach ensured that the nonconforming use was not
extended or enlarged, while allowing the owners to comply with State law. Thus, the
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decision in O'Neal essentially rejects the City's approach, which presumably would have
resulted in an affirmation of the permit denial on the ground that the nursing home owners
could have complied with State law by simply shutting down the building entirely or using
it for other permissible activities.
The City's rule would also have changed the outcome in A. L. Carrithers & Son v.
City of Louisville, 63 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1933). There, health regulators required the owner
of a nonconforming milk plant to make certain structural additions and alterations or else lose
its grade "A" rating. Id. at 495. Much as in this case, zoning authorities in A L. Carrithers
denied the necessary permit on the grounds that the new construction (1) would "materially
increase[] the size of the building"; (2) would "indefinitely prolong[] the life of a nonconforming use"; and (3) would be "contrary to the purpose and intent of the zoning
ordinance." Id. However, rather than strictly enforce the nonconforming use ordinance (as
the City here presumably would) on the basis that the owner was still free to make grade "B"
milk products - or even shut down its operations altogether - the court held that the two sets
of regulations could not be "enforced so that the one [regulation] may require 'structural
alterations' to fulfill its requirements, [while] the other [regulation] prohibits]" the very
thing that is required. Id. at 497. Given the circumstances, the court rejected as "unsound
and untenable" the argument that allowing the plant to modernize would "prolong the life of
the plant indefinitely, materially increase the size of the building and would be contrary to
the purpose and intent of the zoning act." Id. The additions and alterations were "simply a
compliance with the requirements of the ordinance regulating the retailing and handling of
milk at [the] plant in accordance with the demands of the chief inspector of the health
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department." Id.
Suffice it to say, the City's argument is as "unsound and untenable" as the
municipality's argument in A L. Carrithers. Golden Eagle had a right to comply with State
regulations without being punished by the City. That only makes sense. The rule in 0 'Neal
provides a reasonable, balanced approach that supports important land use goals but does not
strip landowners of their nonconforming use when they are forced to comply with important
State health, safety, or environmental regulations. The City's approach should be rejected
as subversive of both the vested rights of property owners and the State's interest in securing
compliance with its regulations.3
VI.

The Certified Tanks Did Not Enlarge, Extend, or Change Golden Eagle's
Nonconforming Use And Therefore Must Be Permitted Under the Ordinance.
Golden Eagle has already set forth at great length why, under reigning standards,

replacement of the Old Tanks with the Certified Tanks did not constitute an enlargement,
extension, or change of its overall nonconforming use, and thus why the Certified Tanks
must be permitted under the City's Ordinance., SeeBrf. App.,pp. 35-42. In its brief, the City
basically ignores that analysis and the substantial case law from other jurisdictions which

3

The cases the City cites do not support its position. See City Brf, pp. 14-15. In
Selligman v. Von Allmen Bros., Inc., 179 S.W.2d 207 (Ky. App. 1944), the court stated
that "[i]t would not have been difficult for [the landowner] to have made his plans comply
with the [regulations] of the health department without replacing the wooden exterior
walls of his plant with brick thereby converting it into a new and different structure." Id.
at 209. By contrast, here it is undisputed that Golden Eagle could not have repaired the
Old Storage Tanks so as to comply with State regulations; they had to be replaced. R.
App. at 84, 103. The decision in Mossman v. City ofColombus, 449 N.W.2d 214 (Ne.
1989), is plainly inapposite because it did not address the situation where a landowner
faces the loss of a nonconforming use because of compliance with State or other
conflicting regulations.
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directly conflicts with its position. It makes no attempt to refute the case law establishing
that, within reasonable limits, increasing the volume or intensity of a nonconforming use is
not a prohibited "enlargement" of that use. Id. The City pays no attention to the eminently
reasonable three-part test set forth by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Derby
Refining Company v. City of Chelsea, 555 N.E.2d 534 (Mass. 1990), for determining whether
there has been an extension of a nonconforming use. See Brf. App., pp. 38-40. Nor does the
City deny that there is absolutely no evidence that the Certified Tanks will impose any
additional impact on the Property or the neighboring properties, much less that the nature or
character of Golden Eagle's nonconforming use will be substantially changed. In fact, all
the evidence suggests the very opposite.
To all this, the City's response is simply that "Golden Eagle's installation of the
Certified Tanks will increase the storage capacity of the plant from its previous capacity."
City Brf, p. 20. This argument fails on every possible level.
First, as explained above, the assertion is factually incorrect. Actual storage capacity
will decrease by 86,000 gallons as a result of the installation of the Certified Tanks when
compared to the capacity of the Old Tanks. The City's insistence to the contrary rests on the
totally spurious argument that since the District Court found that the Old Tanks had ceased
to be in use under the Ordinance because they had been removed from the Property, when
the Certified Tanks were installed they increased the storage capacity above what it was
without the Old Tanks. City Brf, p. 21. This argument begs the entire question of whether
the District Court was correct in its conclusion that there was a cessation of use because
Golden Eagle removed the Old Tanks to install others that complied with State law Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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obviously a central issue in this case. Moreover, the argument is absurd: the Court cannot
i

just ignore the capacity of the Old Tanks when ascertaining whether replacement tanks
constitute an expansion of the nonconforming use of which the Old Tanks were an integral
part.4

(

Second, the City's argument misses the point entirely. Even assuming arguendo that
the Certified Tanks increased Golden Eagle's storage capacity, that does not answer the
question whether such an increase constitutes an enlargement or extension of the
nonconforming use under § 12-22-104 of the Ordinance. See Add. at 2. The City merely
assumes that an increase in storage capacity automatically equals an unlawful enlargement
of the nonconforming use.5 But as demonstrated in Golden Eagle's opening brief, under the
standards established in cases like Derby, supra, and Keller v. City ofBellingham, 600 P.2d
1276 (Wash. 1979), courts do not merely make such assumptions but rather inquire into the
facts of the situation to determine the actual impact of the proposed change. That is precisely
what the court did in Gilchrist v. Town of Lake George Planning Board, 680 N.Y.S.2d 320

4

The City also argues that because the Old Tanks were not in compliance with
State regulations, their capacity must be ignored and any effort to remedy the problem
necessarily increases the storage capacity. City Brf, p. 19. By this rationale, Golden
Eagle would have expanded its nonconforming use had it been able to fix the problem by
simply patching the Old Tanks, since that would have brought noncompliant tanks into
compliance. This illustrates well the City's strategy of dismantling legal nonconforming
uses bolt by bolt. Neither State law, the Ordinance, nor case law from other jurisdictions
countenances such an arbitrary approach.
5

The City's precise language is: "[I]n this case, Golden Eagle's installation of the
Certified Tanks will increase the storage capacity of the plant from its previous capacity.
Therefore, installation of the Certified Tanks represents an unlawful enlargement of the
nonconforming use as determined by the District Court." City Brf, p. 20 (emphasis
added). There is no Digitized
such syllogism
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(N.Y. App. Div. 1998), on which the City relies. City Brf., p. 20. Based on the facts, it
concluded that the proposed change "would increase the volume and scope of the business"
and thus was improper. Id. at 322.
No such evidence has been adduced here. Indeed, all evidence indicates that the
overall impact of Golden Eagle's nonconforming use will decrease due to the installation of
the Certified Tanks. Under the Ordinance, installation of the Certified Tanks did not
constitute a prohibited enlargement or extension of Golden Eagle's nonconforming use.
VII.

In The Alternative, The Certified Tanks Must Be Allowed As An Accessory Use.
Under the Ordinance, a "use which is incidental to and subordinate to the prescribed

permitted use" is pennitted as an accessory use. Woods Cross City Ordinances § 12-2-103
(emphasis added). In its opening brief, Golden Eagle demonstrated why, in the alternative,
the Certified Tanks should be allowed as an accessory use. Brf. App., pp. 42-47.
In response, the City concedes that "Golden Eagle's use of the Certified Tanks may
very well be incidental and subordinate to the primary use on the Property," but then argues
that nevertheless the Certified Tanks are not pemiitted under the Ordinance because Golden
Eagle failed to use its tanks for more than a year. City Brf, p. 17. This argument mixes
apples and oranges. The accessory use issue is separate from the abandonment issue; they
are two distinct analyses. Golden Eagle's accessory use argument is made in the alternative:
in the event the Court decides that the Certified Tanks are not permitted as an integral part
of Golden Eagle's nonconforming use, the Court should find that the Certified Tanks are
nevertheless permissible as a use that is accessory to the nonconforming use. The issue of
abandonment is therefore irrelevant, since (as an alternative argument) Golden Eagle is
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essentially seeking permission to install an entirely new (accessory) use. The City's analysis
conflates these very separate inquires.
As set forth in the opening brief, installation of the Certified Tanks easily meets the
five relevant factors for identifying an accessory use. See Brf. App., pp. 43-44. In its brief,
the City never addresses these factors nor disputes Golden Eagle's conclusion that the
Certified Tanks are "incidental to and subordinate to" its larger nonconforming use.
The City relies on Gilchrist v. Town of Lake George Planning Board, 680 N.Y.S.2d
320 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998), but to no avail. In Gilchrist, the court addressed whether
installation of a new gasoline tank, double the size of the old one, at a nonconforming marina
was "truly incidental to the nonconforming use and does not change the basic nature of the
use of the property." Id. at 322 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis
added). The proposed "accessory use" failed this test because, as extensive testimony at
public hearings established, the new tank would in fact "change the basic nature" of the
marina, increasing "the volume and the scope of the business of the marina as it has existed."
Id. The court found this to be "an expansion and enlargement of the original use of the
property as a marina" that would "violate[] the provisions of the zoning ordinance." Id. In
other words, the new tank would not be accessory to the nonconforming use but rather an
expansion of that use. In dicta, the court stated that because there had been no sale of
gasoline for the last 15 years, the use of selling gasoline had also been abandoned. Id. By
contrast, here there is no evidence that the Certified Tanks will in any way change the nature
of Golden Eagle's oil reclamation activities; there is no evidence the volume and scope of
Golden Eagle's business will change; the undisputed evidence has established that the
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combined capacity of the Certified Tanks is smaller, not larger, than what they will replace;
and there is no evidence that Golden Eagle has abandoned the use of storing petroleum in
tanks for recycling or ultimate disposal. Gilchrist does not support the City's cause.
The District Court's ruling on accessory use, which was based on a factual mistake
regarding increased capacity and invocation of the "spirit of the zoning act" (Add. at 20), was
erroneous. To the extent the Court rejects the argument that storage of used petroleum
product is an inseparable part of Golden Eagle's overall nonconforming use (and thus fully
permissible as such), it is beyond serious debate that the storage of used oil is reasonably
related to, incidental to, and subordinate to the primary activity of recycling oil. Again, even
the City essentially concedes that point. See City Brf, p. 17 ("... use of the Certified Tanks
may very well be incidental and subordinate to the primary use on the Property . . . . " ) .
Accordingly, in the alternative, Golden Eagle is entitled to store used petroleum products in
the Certified Tanks as an accessory use.
VIII. The Rule Golden Eagle Proposes Is Narrow And Will Not Materially Disrupt
The City's Land Use Goals.
Finally, it bears repeating that upholding Golden Eagle's right to install the Certified
Tanks will not materially disrupt the City's land use goals nor set a precedent that will
undermine appropriate land use planning in other jurisdictions. Under compulsion of State
law and at great expense, Golden Eagle replaced seventeen environmentally unsound storage
tanks with six newer ones that (1) satisfied the demands of State law, (2) reduced the overall
storage capacity of its operations, and (3) reduced the visual and environmental impact on
neighboring properties. Reversing the District Court under these narrow facts and pursuant
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to the well reasoned standards set out in 0 'Neal, Derby, and the other cases relied on by
Golden Eagle in its opening brief, will in no way undermine appropriate land use planning
objectives. Affirming the decision below, by contrast, will only discourage others from
making the type of effort which Golden Eagle has made to clean up a bad situation and
operate an environmentally sound - and much needed - business.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and those set forth in the Brief of Appellant, Golden Eagle
respectfully requests that the decision of the District Court be reversed and that summary
judgment be entered in its favor.
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